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“. . . I am getting curioser
and curioser. . .”
Alice in Wonderland
n the 1970s and mid-1980s, the government’s
credit financing approach was characterized as
supply-led whose hallmarks were mandatory
credit allocation, loan targeting, below-market
interest rates and credit subsidies to target sectors. The
government provided funding sourced from budgetary ap-
propriations and foreign loans for the subsidized credit
programs. The intention was to provide loans to small
farmers, small fisherfolk and generally small-scale bor-
rowers because of their inability to borrow from banks.
I
Government intervention in the credit markets was
thought to be justified because banks did not consider
this type of borrowers attractive.
Unfortunately, the results were far from expectations.
Various studies (Esguerra 1981; Neri and Llanto 1985;
among others) showed that the intended beneficiaries
did not get the credit subsidies; many rural banks that
participated in the government’s subsidized credit pro-
grams collapsed; and the government was burdened by
unpaid loans and huge arrears.
In view of these, the government, with much prodding
from multilateral lending institutions, adopted the stance
of financial liberalization and deregulation of interest rates
in the 1980s. Market-oriented financial and credit policy
started to replace the financial repression policies of the
earlier decades. However, despite attempts of the De-
partment of Agriculture (DA) and the Agricultural Credit
Policy Council (ACPC) to rationalize the agricultural credit
programs at this time, directed credit programs still con-
tinued to proliferate. It was not until in recent years that
this approach was abandoned by the government for a
more nontraditional and liberal approach: microfinance.
This Notes briefly traces this eventual shift and cites the
advantages of the new approach.July 2003 2
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1G.M. Llanto, M.P Geron and C. Tang. 1997. Directed credit
programs in the Philippines.
2Data on initial fund allocation for 63 DCPs that reported to
the survey conducted by the Credit Policy Improvement Program
(CPIP) of the National Credit Council, Department of Finance.
Goodbye directed credit programs...
As recently as 1997, there were still as many as 86 di-
rected (read: subsidized) credit programs being imple-
mented by 42 nonfinancial government agencies and gov-
ernment financial institutions.1 With as much as P40 bil-
lion (or 1.8% of GNP in 1996) in government funds and
monies calculated to have been borrowed from external
donors and channeled to these directed credit programs,2
it is unfortunate that these programs proved to be money-
losing undertakings with loan repayment estimated at
an average of 82.6 percent. But what is even more unfor-
tunate is the fact that only a few of the intended benefi-
ciaries—small farmers, fisherfolk, and microentrepre-
neurs—got to enjoy the credit subsidies.
Thus, because the directed credit programs became a
costly and wasteful government intervention, policy-
makers eventually decided to do away with this approach.
In 1997, Congress made the bold move to phase out all
agricultural credit subsidies and install a market-oriented
credit policy framework for all agricultural lending through
the enactment of Republic Act (RA) 8435 or the Agricul-
ture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA).
The AFMA terminated the directed credit programs and
consolidated them into the Agricultural Modernization
Credit and Financing Program (AMCFP) which shall then
serve the credit demand of the agriculture sector through
the use of market-based interest rates and will be imple-
mented through government and private financial institu-
tions.
To complement the AFMA, the government issued Execu-
tive Order (EO) No. 138 which, aside from phasing out all
directed credit programs (DCPs) in other sectors, also
terminated the participation of nonfinancial government
agencies in the implementation of such credit programs.
EO 138 also mandated the adoption of market-based fi-
nancial and credit policies and required the use of gov-
ernment financial institutions as wholesale credit institu-
tions to the private financial institutions that will take
care of on-lending at the retail level.
The underlying philosophy of both the AFMA and EO 138
was that market-based policies and mechanisms in the
financial markets will provide the poor households, the
small farmers and microentrepreneurs better access to
finance services. At the same time, however, some inter-
est groups pointed out then that the withdrawal of the
DCPs would create a vacuum in the credit markets at the
expense of the target beneficiaries.
Was this fear justified? What has happened since then?
Hello, microfinance…
Because of the failure of the traditional formal banking
system and the government’s DCPs to provide small-scale
clients access to loans and other finance services, credit-
granting nongovernment organizations (NGOs) were mo-
tivated to take the lead in developing and evolving vari-
ous microfinancing techniques that could effectively reach
the poor on a sustained basis.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as credit-granting
NGOs provide micro or small loans without collateral at
The underlying philosophy of both the AFMA
and EO 138 was that market-based policies
and mechanisms in the financial markets will
provide the poor households, the small farmers
and microentrepreneurs better access to
finance services. At the same time, however,
...the withdrawal of the DCPs would create
a vacuum in the credit markets at the expense
of the target beneficiaries.No. 2003-06 3
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market rates of interest to small-scale clientele, mostly
nonfarm enterprises and microenterprises. Typically, the
MFI’s familiarity with the borrower and the local economy
enables it to extend loans based on the borrower’s cash
flow and to tailor fit the loan repayment in accordance
with that cash flow. It follows the simplest documenta-
tion, lending, loan collection and monitoring procedures
and uses proven lending mechanisms such as peer pres-
sure and joint liability groups to ensure borrower disci-
pline, incentives to motivate good behavior of clients and
loan officers, and threats of cancelation of future loans
for defaulting borrowers, among others.
Through the years since the phase-out of DCPs, MFIs
began to take their roots in the country’s credit finance
system.
For its part, the government, through the National Credit
Council of the Department of Finance, issued a National
Strategy for Microfinance, a policy and strategy document
that maps out the respective roles of government, gov-
ernment financial institutions, regulatory authorities and
private microfinance institutions such as credit-granting
NGOs, rural banks, and donors in the development of
microfinance in the country.
The document was instrumental in making government
assume a different role in the credit markets. From a
direct provider of subsidized loans, the government has
taken, as its task, a hand-holding role in the creation of a
policy and regulatory environment that will support the
development of market-oriented financial programs for the poor.
At the same time, Congress introduced innovative provi-
sions on microfinance in the revised General Banking
Law of 2000 (RA 8791). To implement said provisions,
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued several
circulars and other guidelines supporting microfinance
development such as the issuance of clear guidelines on
the treatment of microfinance-oriented banks; provision
of a rediscounting facility for banks engaged in micro-
finance; and formulation of a supervision format that is
appropriate for microfinance operations of banks.
Meanwhile, what became the lead government institu-
tion for raising financial resources for microfinance ser-
vices was the People’s Credit and Finance Corporation
(PCFC) which was organized and registered by the Land
Bank of the Philippines as a microfinance company. With
ODA assistance provided through the ADB-IFAD Rural
Microfinance Project and the Microfinance Loan Fund, a
component of the Countryside Loan Fund project of the
World Bank with the Land Bank of the Philippines, the
PCFC was able to provide wholesale loans to accredited
MFIs which in turn lent to microfinance clients.
Market-based credit policies have proven
effective...
Given the above developments, what have been the re-
sults so far?
Data from the Microfinance Council of the Philippines,
as shown in Tables 1 and 2, seem to indicate that the
twin objectives of serving a greater number of poor cli-
ents (outreach) while at the same time, ensuring the
sustainability of the financial institutions serving them
are being met. The implication is that the government
has found in microfinance a very good substitute to DCPs.
On the one hand, the poor are having access to sustain-
able finance services without creating a fiscal and insti-
Table 1. Performance of microfinance
institutions, 2001- 2002
  Aggregate data    Aggregate data
   of 15 MFIs as of 12 MFIs as
of Dec. 31, 2002 of Dec 31, 2001
Number of branches 172 121
Number of staff 2,324 1,475
Number of field staff 1,881 1,177
Number of borrowers
    and savers 382,672 251,211
Value of loans
    outstanding (pesos) 1,566,435,367 1,050,458,155
Value of clients’ savings
    deposit (pesos) 638,511,066 402,633,016
Source: Microfinance Council of the PhilippinesJuly 2003 4
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tutional burden on the part
of government. On the other
hand, private MFIs are hav-
ing a good business with
microfinance.
Table 1 suggests a rapid ex-
pansion of outreach in terms
of borrowers and savers.3 In
2002, the Microfinance
Council of the Philippines
reported that there was a
general trend on the part of
leading MFIs to expand to
relatively poorer provinces.
For instance, the Taytay sa
Kauswagan, Inc. (TSKI) has
established branches in
Leyte, Southern Leyte,
Samar and Siquijor while the
Negros for Women Tomorrow
Foundation (NWTF) opened a
new branch in Palawan, thereby expanding to areas out-
side of Negros Island and Cebu. Community Economic
Ventures, Inc. (CEVI), with its head office in Bohol, has
branches in Palawan, Agusan del Sur and South Cotabato.
Tulay sa Pag-unlad, Inc. (TSPI) opened new branches in
Camarines Norte while the Center for Agriculture and Rural
Development (CARD) chose to open new branches in the
poorer municipalities of Camarines Sur. There is a rela-
tively high concentration of MFIs operating in Bulacan,
Laguna, Nueva Ecija, Bohol and Cebu—areas where there
is higher than average economic activity.4
Table 2, in the meantime, shows the sustainability indi-
cators of the 15 reporting members of the Microfinance
Council of the Philippines. Five out of the 15 MFIs report
that they have achieved levels of financial self-sufficiency
exceeding 100 percent, meaning they have the capacity
to reach more poor people on a sustainable basis. Oth-
ers are working hard to achieve operational and financial
self-sufficiency.
The promise starts to be realized...
What really bodes well, though, for the small-scale cli-
ents are the reports from the field that indicate that not
only the credit-granting NGOs are serving the microfinance
market but also the mainstream banking sector. Table 3
shows BSP data on the growing microfinance exposure
of microfinance-oriented banks.
_______________
3In 2002, 15 MFI members of the 22-member organization
called the Microfinance Council of the Philippines reported the field
data. In 2001, only 12 members reported. While the two observa-
tions are not strictly comparable because there were fewer members
reporting in 2001, the data reported in Tables 1 and 2 are indicative
of the progress being made by MFIs in reaching the poor on a sus-
tainable basis.
4Microfinance Council of the Philippines. 2002. Update on the
performance of the Council Members. July. Space limitations pre-
vent a more detailed explanation of the recent performance of MFIs.
The Update provides details.
Table 2.  Sustainability indicators of 15 member MFIs
(as of December 31, 2002 and in averages)
  Operational     Financial   Equity to Current  Savings to
self-sufficiency self-sufficiency  asset ratio    ratio   loan ratio
      (OSS)        (FSS)
  (in percent)    (in percent) (in percent) (in percent)
All MFIs (n=15) 107.6 95.1 39.0 2.5 40.3
By scale of operations
Large 122.9 103.9 29.3 2.0 39.3
Medium 100.7 95.9 52.6 2.2 39.2
Small 102.1 88.8 36.3 2.9 41.5
By age of MF operations
New 94.6 79.4 60.7 3.2 31.2
Young 92.5 81.8 51.9 2.4 44.5
Mature 115.3 103.3 32.1 2.3 42.2
By FSS levels
FSS MFIs 126.5 116.4 36.8 2.3 41.3
Non-FSS MFIs 97.2 83.3 40.2 2.6 39.8
Source of data: Microfinance Council of the PhilippinesNo. 2003-06 5
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All these are welcome developments for the small-scale
clients who have traditionally failed to access finance
services in the formal financial markets.
But beware of policy reversals!
The countries that have shown remarkable progress in
microfinance development are those that have stayed
the market-based path. In a previous Policy Notes,5 this
author pointed out the pitfalls that policymakers face in
their desire to support microfinance. For example, there
is the temptation to rush things and make microfinance
accessible to as many poor people as possible without
considering the possible implication on the sustainability
of microfinance institutions and borrower discipline.
In this regard, there is a need to keep the market orien-
tation of credit and financial policies and at the same
time review the following:
X the threat to revoke EO 138; and
X the section of RA 9178 known as the “Barangay
Micro Business Enterprises Act of 2002.”
On the reported plan to revoke EO 138, what is being
considered is the restoration of subsidized credit pro-
grams to benefit target beneficiaries. In effect, this will
reverse the policy thrusts of the government that have
achieved significant results in a relatively short period of
time. With regard to Section 9 of RA 9178, known as the
“Barangay Micro Business Enterprises Act of 2002,”
meanwhile, which directs the Land Bank of the Philip-
pines, Development Bank of the Philippines, Small Busi-
ness Guarantee and Finance Corporation and the People’s
Credit and Finance Corporation to create a special credit
window that will service the financing needs of barangay
microbusiness enterprises, it should be pointed out that
the creation of these “special credit windows” is virtually
like a revival of the failed subsidized credit programs.
Policymakers should thus bear in mind the recent perfor-
mance of local MFIs as well as those of successful MFIs
around the world that offers a lasting testimony to the
efficacy of market-based approaches in order to resist
the temptation of resorting to populist credit programs.
    
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Table 3.  Microfinance Portfolio




Rural banks (2)       6.00       570
Thrift banks (2)     87.27   22,061
Traditional banks
Rural banks (66) 1,258.50 232,855
Cooperative banks (25)      507.41    87,061
Total 1,859.18 342,547
Source: Bangko Sentral ng PilipinasJuly 2003 6
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